Abstract-Cyber-physical systems (CPS) often rely on external communication for supervisory control or sensing. Unfortunately, these communications render the system vulnerable to cyberattacks. Attacks that alter messages, such as replay attacks that record measurement signals and then play them back to the system, can cause devastating effects. Dynamic Watermarking methods, which inject a private excitation into control inputs to secure resulting measurement signals, have begun addressing the challenges of detecting these attacks, but have been restricted to linear time invariant (LTI) systems. Though LTI models are sufficient for some applications, other CPS, such as autonomous vehicles, require more complex models. This paper develops a linear time-varying (LTV) extension to previous Dynamic Watermarking methods by designing a matrix normalization factor to accommodate the temporal changes in the system. Implementable tests are provided with considerations for realworld systems. The proposed method is then shown to be able to detect generalized replay attacks both in theory and in simulation using a LTV vehicle model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) combine both networked computing and sensing resources with physical control systems in an effort to increase efficiency, manage complexity, or provide convenience. Whether it is industrial control applications or smart devices, CPS require secure networked communications to operate safely and correctly. Malicious attacks on such systems can cause devastating results [1] - [4] . CPS are often protected by traditional cyber security tools, but these methods are insufficient due to the addition of networked physical infrastructure. [5] , [6] . A growing body of work has started to address these challenges by developing new detection algorithms, analyzing potentially stealthy attack models, and finding ways of reducing the effect of attacks. One particular detection method, Dynamic Watermarking, has been shown to detect various attack models while making few assumptions about system structure. Despite these developments, detection algorithms, including Dynamic Watermarking, have only focused on CPS that can be modeled as linear time invariant (LTI) systems. While LTI models can be sufficient for steady state or slow moving applications, many emerging CPS
B. Attack Detection Algorithms
The measurement residual, defined as the difference between the measurement and the expected measurement, is used by most detection schemes. For each detector, a metric based on the measurement residual is generated. If at any time the metric exceeds a user-defined threshold, the detector raises an alarm. Generally, these metrics can be separated into two categories: those that only observe the system, called passive methods, and those that alter the system while observing, called active methods. While passive methods do not degrade control performance, active methods accept a small amount of performance degradation in exchange for the ability to detect more complex attacks [15] - [17] . These categories can be further subdivided into stateless metrics, which only consider the current measurement residual, and stateful metrics, which rely on previous measurement residuals as well.
1) Passive Methods:
The χ 2 detector's metric is the inner product of the normalized measurement residual, which follows a χ 2 distribution. Due to its simplicity, the χ 2 detector has been studied in several works [18] - [21] . Though the χ 2 is widely used, it is a stateless detector. Two stateful alternatives are the cumulative sum (CUSUM) detector and the multivariate exponentially weighted moving average (MEWMA) detector. When comparing these stateful detectors to the χ 2 detector, it has been shown that the stateful detectors can often provide stronger guarantees on detection while the χ 2 detector boasts both simpler implementation and generally takes less time to detect attacks [22] , [23] . While passive detectors can detect random attacks, they are unable to detect more sophisticated attacks such as replay attacks. In addition, they have only been developed for LTI systems.
2) Active Methods: Most active methods fall into one of two categories: moving target defense, which change system parameters to keep attackers from obtaining the current configuration, and watermarking-based methods, which encrypt measurement signals with a watermark that is added to the control input.
The concept of moving target defenses is a topic of continued interest for the field of cyber security and includes randomizing the order of code execution and physical memory storage locations [24] . In CPS, moving target defense can take the form of switching between redundant measurements [25] - [29] , altering control strategy [25] , [29] , or by changing plant dynamics [25] - [27] , [30] - [33] . Switching measurement signals works well when an attacker is only hacking a few measurements, but otherwise performs similar to passive methods. Altering the control strategy is arguably similar to watermarking-based methods and can allow for detection of most attack models except zero-dynamics attacks. While some methods alter the physical plant dynamics directly [25] - [27] , others append the plant dynamics with an auxiliary system with possibly more complex dynamics [30] - [33] . Despite the consideration of more complex dynamics for the auxiliary systems, moving target defense has only been applied to systems that have LTI dynamics. Although complex dynamics cause the behavior of the test metric to change in time, methods for selecting a time-varying threshold involve hand tuning. Altering plant dynamics can allow for detection of all attack models, but the method makes certain assumptions about the system. Note, for the auxiliary systems it is assumed that the plant has secure knowledge of its own state, which does not account for vulnerable networked sensors. Also, when an auxiliary system is not used, it is assumed that the plant dynamics are changeable.
The introduction of a watermark was first proposed as a way of making the χ 2 detector robust to replay attacks [34] and other more advanced attacks [35] . Here, the watermark takes the form of independent identically distributed (IID) Gaussian noise that is added to the control input. Robustness to replay attacks is then achieved by properly selecting the watermark covariance, while the χ 2 detector itself remains unchanged. Dynamic Watermarking uses a metric that relies on both the covariance of the residuals and the correlation between the residuals and the watermark. The covariance of the watermark is allowed to be an arbitrary symmetric full rank matrix [36] - [40] . In these works, the metric uses the measurement residuals contained in a temporally sliding window. Guarantees of detection are then made as the window size tends to infinity. Extensions to a limited subset of nonlinear systems have been implemented [38] , [41] , but otherwise Dynamic Watermarking has been limited to LTI systems. Though the addition of the watermark causes a degradation in system performance, the degradation can be minimized [42] , [43] . Other work has considered allowing the watermark signal to be auto-correlated [44] or to have distributions that are not Gaussian [45] , [46] . Furthermore, other forms of watermarks include intentional package drops [47] , [48] , using parameterized transforms on measurements [11] , [49] , [50] , and B-splines added to feed forward inputs [51] . Though Dynamic Watermarking is unable to detect zero-dynamics attacks, it does not require the assumption of changeable plant dynamics or locally secure knowledge of plant state. This paper focuses on Dynamic Watermarking as described in Hespanhol et al. [37] due to its ability to be applied to a wide range of LTI systems including both fully and partially observable systems.
C. Contributions
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, the tests used in Hespanhol et al. [37] are extended to LTV systems. This is done using a carefully designed matrix normalization factor to accommodate the temporal changes in the system. These tests are then proven to detect generalized replay attacks. Second, a model is developed for time-varying generalized replay attacks. Third, LTV Dynamic Watermarking is applied to a simulated system to provide proof of concept.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I-D introduces notation. Section II reviews the methods in Hespanhol et al. [37] to motivate the need for LTV Dynamic Watermarking. Asymptotic guarantees and implementable tests for LTV Dynamic Watermarking are provided in Sections III and IV respectively. Simulated results are presented in Section V. The appendix covers statistical background for the proofs in this paper in addition to a few larger equations that have been removed from proofs to improve readability.
D. Notation
This section breifly introduces the notation used in this paper. The 2-norm of a vector x is denoted x . Similarly, the 2-norm of a matrix X is denoted X . The trace of a matrix X is denoted tr(X). Zero matrices of dimension i × j are denoted 0 i×j , and in the case that i = j, the notation is simplified to 0 i . Identity matrices of dimension i are denoted I i .
The Wishart distribution with scale matrix Σ and i degrees of freedom is denoted W(Σ, i) [52, Section 7.2]. The multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean µ and covariance Σ is denoted N (µ, Σ). The chi-squared distribution with i degrees of freedom is denoted χ 2 (i). The expectation of a random variable a is denoted E[a]. The probability of an event E is denoted P(E). Given a sequence of random variables
, convergence in probability is denoted p-lim i→∞ a i and almost sure convergence is denoted as-lim i→∞ a i [53, Definition 7.2.1].
II. INSPIRATION FOR LTV WATERMARKING
This section describes the inspiration for LTV dynamic watermarking by summarizing the method described in Hespanhol et al. [37] for LTI systems. Consider an LTI system with state x n , measurement y n , process noise w n , measurement noise z n , watermark e n , additive attack v n , and stabilizing feedback that uses the observed statex
where x n ,x n , w n ∈ R p , e n ∈ R q , y n , z n , v n ∈ R r , and x 0 = 0 p×1 . The process noise w n , measurement noise z n , and watermark e n are mutually independent and take the form w n ∼ N (0 p×1 , Σ w ), z n ∼ N (0 r×1 , Σ z ), and e n ∼ N (0 q×1 , Σ e ). While the process and measurement noise are unknown to the controller, the watermark signal is generated by the controller and is known. The following assumption is made on the controller, observer, and watermark design.
Assumption II.1. Assume A + BK < 1, A + LC < 1, and Σ e is full rank.
The measurement residual for this system takes the form Cx n − y n . When an attack is not present, the distribution of the measurement residuals converge to a zero mean Gaussian distribution with covariance Σ where
Note, for a LTV system, the limit in (4) may not exist. Next, consider a generalization of a replay attack satisfying
where α ∈ R is called the attack scaling factor, the false state ξ n ∈ R p has process noise ω n ∈ R p and measurement noise ζ n ∈ R r that take the form ω n ∼ N (0 p×1 , Σ ω ) and ζ n ∼ N (0 r×1 , Σ ζ ), and are mutually independent with each other and with w n and z n . Note, when Σ ω and Σ ζ are selected such that the covariance of the measurement residual is unaltered and the attack scaling parameter is −1, this model describes a replay attack. While attackers may have the ability to start and stop attacks at will, attacks that are only present for finite time are not guaranteed to be detected. Therefore, when considering asymptotic guarantees of detection, the assumption of persistence is made. To formally describe these persistent attacks, consider the following definition.
Definition II.2. The asymptotic attack power is defined as
Under this definition, an attack with non-zero asymptotic power is deemed to be persistent. The asymptotic claims of LTI dynamic watermarking take the form of the following theorem. (6), and Σ satisfying (4) .
and as-lim
then the asymptotic attack power is 0.
The delay of the watermark by k ′ in (9) ensures that the effect of the watermark is present in the measurement signal. Note, the contrapositive of Theorem II.3 states that for attacks with non-zero asymptotic power, (8) and (9) cannot both be satisfied. Therefore, considering the LHS of (8) and (9) , generalized replay attacks of non-zero asymptotic power are guaranteed to be detected in infinite time.
To make these tests implementable in real time, a statistical test is derived using a sliding window of fixed size. At each step, the combined partial sums in (8)-(9) take the form
Under the assumption of no attack, S n converges asymptotically to the Wishart distribution with scale matrix
and ℓ degrees of freedom as ℓ → ∞. Furthermore, for a generalized replay attack of non-zero asymptotic power, Theorem II.3 gives us that the scale matrix for S n is no longer S, since either (8) or (9) is not satisfied. Given the sampled matrix S n , the test then uses the negative log likelihood of the scale matrix
Negative log likelihood values that exceed a user defined threshold, signal an attack.
For LTV systems, the limits in (8)- (9) may not exist. Furthermore, the sampled matrices S n may no longer be approximated as a Wishart distribution since the vectors used to create it in (10) are not necessarily identically distributed. To accommodate these changes in distribution, it is necessary to develop a new method.
III. LTV DYNAMIC WATERMARKING
This section derives the limit-based formulation of Dynamic Watermarking for a discrete-time LTV system. First, the LTV dynamics, necessary assumptions, and the resulting limit based tests are defined. Subsequently, Section III-A provides intermediate results to prove these claims.
Consider an LTV system with state x n , measurement y n , process noise w n , measurement noise z n , watermark e n , additive attack v n , and stabilizing feedback that uses the observed statex
where x n ,x n , w n ∈ R p , e n ∈ R q , y n , z n , v n ∈ R r , and x 0 = 0 p×1 . The process noise w n , measurement noise z n , and watermark e n are mutually independent and take the form w n ∼ N (0 p×1 , Σ w,n ), z n ∼ N (0 r×1 , Σ z,n ), and e n ∼ N (0 q×1 , Σ e ). While the process and measurement noise are unknown to the controller, the watermark signal is generated by the controller and is known. For simplicity, definē
We make the following assumption.
Assumption III.1. The covariances Σ e , Σ w,n , and Σ z,n , of the random variables used in (13)- (14) , are full rank. Furthermore, there exists positive constants η w , η z , ηĀ, η B , η C ∈ R such that Σ w,n < η w , Σ z,n < η z , Ā n < ηĀ < 1, B n < η B , and C n < η C , for all n ∈ N.
The assumption of bounded full rank covariances for the process and measurement noise are satisfied for most systems by modeling error and sensor noise. Furthermore, the input and output matrices are often constrained to be finite by sensor and actuator limits. Since the watermark and controller are user defined, the remainder of the assumptions can be satisfied so long as the system is controllable. We make the following assumption.
Assumption III.2.
Here, (15) guarantees an asymptotic correlation between the measurement signal y n and the watermark signal e n−1 , which has been delayed by a single time step. This ensures that the watermark has a persistent measurable effect on the measurement signal, which can then be used for validation purposes. This is similar to assuming k ′ is equal to 0 for the LTI case.
The observer and the corresponding observer error, defined as δ n =x n − x n , satisfŷ
whereδ 0 =δ 0 = 0 p×1 . Note that δ n =δ n +δ n and that when v n = 0 r×1 , ∀n we have thatδ n = 0 p×1 , ∀n. Hereδ n can be thought of as the portion of the observer error that results from the original noise of the system, whileδ n is the contribution of the attack to the observer error. Next, consider the expected value Σ δ,n = E[δ nδ
, which can be written as
The matrix normalization factor is then defined as
which exists since Σ z,n is full rank. For an LTI system, the matrix V n = Σ −1/2 where Σ is as defined in (4). For the LTV system, the matrix normalization factor can be thought of as a time-varying normalization for the measurement residual. Next, we make the following assumption about the observer.
If the system in (13)- (14) is observable, then the user defined controller can satisfy the assumption on A n . Previous assumptions imply the assumptions on L n , Σ δ,n , and V n are satisfied, but the bounds here are used to simplify notation.
Next, we alter the attack defined in (5)- (6) to create a timevarying equivalent. Consider an attack v n that satisfies
where α ∈ R is called the attack scaling factor, the false state ξ n ∈ R p has process noise ω n ∈ R p and measurement noise ζ n ∈ R r that take the form ω n ∼ N (0 p×1 , Σ ω,n ) and ζ n ∼ N (0 r×1 , Σ ζ,n ) and are mutually independent with each other and with w n and z n . Similar to the LTI case, when Σ ω,n and Σ ζ,n are selected properly and the attack scaling parameter is −1, this model describes a replay attack. The results of such an attack can have devastating results as shown in Figure 1 . While an attacker could choose to allow the noise to have unbounded covariance, the resulting attack would be trivial to detect. Therefore, we make the following assumption about the attack model. 
To make asymptotic guarantees of detection, we also assume the persistence of attacks using the following definition.
Definition III.5. The asymptotic attack power is defined as
Similar to prior research in Dynamic Watermarking, we first define the asymptotic tests.
Theorem III.6. Consider an attacked LTV system satisfying the dynamics in (13)- (19) . Let V n be as defined in (21) .
and p-lim
Furthermore, if the attack follows the dynamics in (22)- (23) and has non-zero asymptotic power as defined in Definition III.5, then (C1) and (C2) cannot both be satisfied.
From Theorem III.6, the LHS of (C1) and (C2) can be used to guarantee detection of generalized replay attacks with non-zero asymptotic power in infinite time. Note, (C1), (C2), and (24) use limits in probability as opposed to the almost sure limits used in their LTI counterparts. This change removes the guarantee of detection via the asymptotic tests for certain pathological examples of attacks, but both forms of convergence provide the same motivation for the statistical tests in Section IV. Given an arbitrary real number ǫ, almost sure convergence states that with probability 1 the sequence will remain a distance of less than ǫ from the limit after a finite number of steps while convergence in probability states that the probability that an element of the sequence is within a distance of ǫ from the limit converges to 1 as you continue along the sequence. Since the statistical tests use a sliding window to consider only a finite number of steps at a time, both forms of convergence say that as the window size grows the sequence of sample averages become more likely to be closer to the limit when no attack is present. As a result, the test becomes more sensitive.
A. Intermediate Results
To prove Theorem III.6, several intermediate results must first be provided. First, we consider the asymptotic limit (C1) and show that it implies α is equal to 0. This allows us to assume that α is equal to 0 for the remainder of the intermediate results.
Theorem III.7. Consider an attacked LTV system satisfying (13)- (19) and the attack model satisfying (22) - (23) . Let V n be as defined in (21) . (C1) holds if and only if the attack scaling factor α is equal to 0.
Proof. (Theorem III.7) Assume that α is equal to 0. Rearranging the LHS of (C1) using (14), (17) , and (22) results in p-lim
Corollary A.5 says that to show that the RHS of (25) converges in probability to 0 r×q , it is sufficient to show that each term in the sum converges in probability to 0 r×q . Note that p-lim
by Corollary A.7 since e n−1 is independent identically distributed with bounded covariance, and V n (C n δ n − C n ξ n ) is a bounded linear transform of a random vector that satisfies the necessary auto correlation bound as a result of Theorem A.9. Similarly, p-lim
by Corollary A.7 since z n , ζ n , and e n−1 are mutually independent identically distributed with bounded covariances. Therefore α = 0 implies (C1) holds. Now assume that (C1) holds. Rearranging (C1) using (14), (17) , and (22) results in p-lim
Now since (27) holds by the same argument as before, we can use Theorem A.4 to cancel these terms resulting in p-lim
Expanding x n in (29) by one step using (13) then results in p-lim
Using Corollary A.7 we have that p-lim
Therefore by Theorem A.4 we have
Note, that all elements of
n−1 (33) are distributed symmetrically about 0 for all n ∈ N. Consider an element of (32) for which the corresponding element in
does not converge. For each i, the probability that the matrix element in (32) is farther away from 0 than the corresponding element in (34) is at least 0.5. Therefore the element cannot converge in probability to 0 completing the proof.
Assuming α is equal to 0, we show that (C2) is equivalent to another condition that is only dependent on the attack v n and its contribution to the observer errorδ n . Note,δ n is not a computable quantity given the available knowledge of the system, but the provided intermediate condition is an amenable surrogate to (C2).
Theorem III.8. Consider an attacked LTV system satisfying (13)- (19) and an attack model satisfying (22) - (23) . Let V n be as defined in (21) 
Proof. (Theorem III.8) Expanding (C2) using (14) and (17)- (19) gives us p-lim
By Corollary A.7 and Theorem A.9, p-lim
since, by the definition of V n in (21), the expectation for each summand in (37) is I r , and V n (C nδn − z n ) is uncorrelated with V n (C nδ − v n ). First, assume that (C2) holds. By Theorem A.4, it follows from (36)- (38) that (35) Since the attack v n , under the assumption that α is equal to 0, is only dependent on the random vectors ξ n and ζ n , we now provide sufficient and necessary conditions on these random vectors for the asymptotic attack power to be 0. Similar to Theorem III.8, these random vectors are not computable by the controller, but the resulting conditions can be used to connect (C2) to the asymptotic attack power.
Theorem III.9. Consider an attacked LTV system satisfying (13)- (19) and an attack model satisfying (22) - (23) . Assume that the attack scaling factor α is equal to 0. The asymptotic attack power as defined in (24) is 0 if and only if
Proof. (Theorem III.9) Assume that α = 0. Using Lemma A.10 we have that the asymptotic attack power is 0 if and only if p-lim
Expanding the LHS of (41) using (22)- (23) we get an equvalent condition.
Since ξ n and ζ n are uncorrelated, from Theorem A.9 and Corollary A.7 we have p-lim
First, assume that (39) and (40) hold. By Corollary A.5 we have that (42) must hold since, when separated, the limit for each term converges to 0 r . Next, assume that (42) holds. By Theorem A.4 we can rewrite (42) as
since (43) holds. Note, both terms are positive-semidefinite matrices. Therefore, for an arbitrary ǫ > 0 we have that
Furthermore, (44) implies
Then, by (45) and (46)
Therefore, (39) must hold. Applying Theorem A.4 to (44) using (39) implies (40) must also hold.
Next, we start to complete the connection between (C2) and zero asymptotic attack power by proving (35) implies (39) . Furthermore, we prove a related result that makes it simpler to prove that (35) implies (40) .
Theorem III.10. Consider an attacked LTV system satisfying (13)- (19) and an attack model satisfying (22) - (23) . Let V n be as defined in (21) . Assume the attack scaling factor α is equal to 0. If (35) holds, then (39) holds as well and
Proof. (Theorem III.10) Assume that (35) holds. Expanding the LHS of (35) using (22) we get p-lim
Using Corollary A.7 and Theorem A.9 we have p-lim
Therefore, by applying Theorem A.4 to (49) we have p-lim
Note, both terms are positive-semidefinite matrices. Using the same method used on (44), we then have
We complete the proof using Lemma A.11 but we must first provide lower bound on the eigenvalues of V ⊺ n V n . Let λ n denote the smallest eignenvalue of V ⊺ n V n , then λ n is lower bounded since
If we assume that (39) does not hold then applying Lemma A.11 contradicts (52). Therefore (39) must hold. Similarly, assuming that (48) does not hold would result in a contradiction with (53) . Therefore (48) must also hold.
Next we prove that (35) implies (40) to complete the relation between (C2) and the asymptotic attack power.
Theorem III.11. Consider an attacked LTV system satisfying (13)- (19) and an attack model satisfying (22) - (23) . Let V n be as defined in (21) . Assume the attack scaling factor α is equal to 0. If (35) holds then (40) holds as well.
To prove Theorem III.11, we instead prove the contrapositive statement by assuming that (40) does not hold, proving that (48) does not hold either, then using Theorem III.10 we complete the proof. To do this, we split the summation in (40) according to the following lemma. This split allows us to disregard the cross terms on the LHS of (48) and shows that the remaining terms do not converge in probability to 0 r . Lemma III.12. Consider an attacked LTV system satisfying (13)- (19) and an attack model satisfying (22) - (23) . Let V n be as defined in (21) . Assume the attack scaling factor α is equal to 0. If (40) does not hold then there exists m ∈ N for which p-lim
where m n = min{n, m}. Furthermore, there exists an m ′ ∈ N such that m ′ ≤ m and
Proof. (Lemma III.12) First, we prove the existence of m. Assume that (40) does not hold. Expanding the LHS of (40) using (23) results in p-lim
Then, using Lemma A.10 we have that p-lim
Since (40) does not hold there exists ǫ, τ > 0 such that
for infinitely many i. We prove that there exists an m such that for each i that (59) holds we have
which is equivalent to (55) as a result of Lemma A.10. To make statements on the truncated sum, we start by finding the relationship between the probability in the LHS of (59) and the probability in the LHS of (60). For each i such that (59) holds, we apply triangle inequality to get
Further expanding and applying Theorem A.1 result in
Focusing on the center term in the RHS of (62), we can write
where the first inequality comes from applying the Cauchy Schwarz Inequality and the second inequality comes from applying Theorem A.2. Then since
and
we can combine (62) with (63)- (65) to obtain τ < 2P
If we can upper bound the second term in the RHS or (66) by τ 2 the first term must be lower bounded by τ 2 completing the proof. To provide this bound we make use of Markov's Inequality. To this end, we first bound the expectation
where the the first equality comes from expanding the norm and ignoring uncorrelated terms, the first inequality comes from rearranging the summation and allowing the second summation to go to infinity, the second inequality comes from distributing the expectation and upper bounding each element, and the final equality comes from evaluating the summations. Since η A1 < 1, we can choose m sufficiently large such that
Using Markov's inequality [54, Equation 5 .31] we have that
which completes the proof for the existence of m. Next, we prove the existence of m ′ . Consider the expansion of (55) p-lim
Considering the summands where j = k we have that p-lim
by Theorem A.6 since ω n is independent and the dynamics are bounded and stable. If we further assume that there does not exist an m ′ for which (56) holds then by Theorem A.1 we have that (55) does not hold which is a contradiction. Therefore, the set of integers less that or equal to m for which (56) holds, is a non-empty finite set. The smallest element of this set then satisfies the conditions for m ′ .
Now returning to prove the Theorem.
Proof. (Theorem III.11) WLOG, in this proof, we allow summations to reference variables with negative index by assuming these values to be 0 r to ease notation. Assume that (35) holds but (40) does not. Since (40) does not hold, m ′ be chosen such that it satisfies the description in Lemma III.12. From Theorem III.10 we have that (35) implies (48) . Expanding the LHS of (48) using (23) gives us p-lim
By separating the index m ′ we can write p-lim
For now suppose that p-lim
Then by Theorem A.4 we have that p-lim
Furthermore, by our choice of m ′ we have that p-lim
and since the terms are all positive-semidefinite matrices
This implies that (73) cannot hold which contradicts (35) . Therefore (40) must hold since otherwise there exists an m ′ satisfying Lemma A.11.
To complete the proof, we now show that (74) indeed holds. by Corollary A.5 this is equivalent to proving p-lim
Note, (78) holds by Corollary A.7 since all ω n are mutually independent, C nĀ(n−1,n−m ′ +1) ≤ C n < η C , and the auto-correlation is bounded by (156) in the appendix. Furthermore, expanding the LHS of (79) using (19) gives us p-lim
To prove that (79) holds, we use Corollary A.5 on (80) and show that each term converges to 0 r . Note, by Theorem A.6, p-lim
since C nĀ(n−1,n−m ′ +1) ≤ η C , ζ n and ω n are mutually independent, and the auto-correlation is bounded by (157) in the appendix. Furthermore, considering the portion ofδ n not dependent on ω n−m ′ , by Theorem A.6, p-lim
since ω n are independent, C nĀ(n−1,n−m ′ +1) ≤ η C , and the auto-correlation is bounded by (158) in the appendix. Now if
we have completed the proof. To show this, we show that the trace of the matrix converges to 0 for each value of j.
where the inequality follow from the Cauchy Schwarz Inequality. Let ǫ, τ > 0 be chosen arbitrarily. Note that by Markov's Inequality Furthermore by our choice of m ′ , we have that there exists an N such that i > N implies
Finally, applying Theorem A.3
Therefore (83) must hold.
Having proven several intermediate results, we are now able to formally prove Theorem III.6.
Proof. (Theorem III.6) When no attack is present, (C1) holds using Theorem III.7 since α is equal to 0. Furthermore, (C2) holds since δ = δ. Now assume that an attack of non-zero asymptotic power is present and consider the following cases. zero asymptotic attack power
Under our assumption of non-zero asymptotic power, the contrapositive implies that (C2) does not hold.
IV. IMPLEMENTABLE STATISTICAL TESTS
While Section III provides a necessary background for LTV Dynamic Watermarking, infinite limits are not well suited for real time attack detection. This section derives a statistical test using a sliding window approach. Let
where ℓ+1 is the window size, ℓ ∈ N, and ℓ ≥ q +r −1. Note, ψ n is asymptotically uncorrelated and identically distributed such that ψ n ∼ N (0 q+r×1 , S), for n = 1, 2, 3, · · · where
Therefore, under the assumption of no attack, the distribution of Q n approaches a Wishart distribution with ℓ + 1 degrees of freedom and scale matrix S as ℓ goes to infinity. Furthermore, for a generalized replay attack with non-zero asymptotic power, Theorem III.6 proves that the scale matrix for Q n is no longer S since either (C1) or (C2) is not satisfied. The Wishart distribution can then be used to define a statistical test using the negative log likelihood of the scale matrix S given the sampled matrix Q n :
In theory, if the process and measurement noise covariances Σ w,n and Σ z,n are known, V n can be calculated using (20)- (21) . In practice, these covariances are difficult to estimate which can lead to error in the estimate of V n . To reduce this error, V n can be directly estimated using an ensemble average of i realizations such that where the superscript (j) is the index of the realization. This approximation is appropriate since by the weak law of large numbers we have that when no attack is present
and V n is defined as in (21).
V. SIMULATED RESULTS
To provide proof of concept, we use a simplified car model
where the car has ground plane coordinates (x, y), heading ψ, forward velocity v, and angular velocityψ. Using the desired trajectory shown in Figure 1 , (95) is linearized and discretized using a step size of 0.05 and zero order hold on the current state and input. The controller and observer for the resulting LTV system are found using a linear quadratic regulator (LQR) to stabilize the system. Furthermore, the process and measurement noise covariances are chosen such that they scale linearly with the velocity. To compare LTI and LTV Dynamic Watermarking, a time invariant matrix normalization factor is calculated using the average of the residual covariance, while the time-varying matrix normalization factor is calculated using (20)- (21) . For both cases, we run 100 simulations with a window size of 20 and calculate the test metric and the average test metric as shown in Figure 2 . Note, while the LTV Dynamic Watermarking metric remains consistent over the entire simulation, the LTI counterpart has a repeatable time-varying pattern.
Using the un-attacked data, a threshold for the LTV case is found such that the rate at which false alarms occur does not exceed once per every 50 seconds of run time. Next consider an attack model satisfying (13)- (19), with α equal to −1 and the measurement and process noise matching that of the true system. The results of this attack on the system, and the ability of LTV Dynamic Watermarking to quickly detect it, are shown in Figure 1 .
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper derives Dynamic Watermarking for LTV systems, and provides asymptotic guarantees in addition to implementable tests. A LTV generalized replay attack is defined and shown to be detectable by the Dynamic Watermarking method developed in this work. Furthermore, a vehicle model with LTV Dynamic Watermarking is simulated to provide proof of concept of the implementable tests. Using these simulations, the LTV Dynamic Watermarking is compared to its LTI counterpart and is shown to provide a more consistent test metric.
APPENDIX
This section outlines the relevant background in statistics used in the paper and provides a few longer equations removed from proofs for readability.
A. Statistical Background
First, we provide inequalities for functions of random variables using the following three theorems.
be a finite set of random variables then
Proof. Assume a i < ǫ s ∀i. This would imply that
Therefore,
Furthermore,
where the first inequality comes from the inclusion of the events and the final inequality comes from Boole's Inequality.
Proof. Assume |a i | < ǫ 1 s ∀i. This would imply that
The remainder of the proof follows closely to Theorem A.1.
Theorem A.3. Let a and b be random variables then for ǫ, γ > 0 we have
Proof. Note that
since |a| < γ and |b| < ǫ/γ implies |ab| < ǫ. By expanding the RHS of (103) using inclusion exclusion and bounding the union term by 1, we get
It is often helpful to split a probabilistic limit into components of the underlying random variable. While this is not possible for all cases, we provide sufficient conditions here. 
Proof. Assume (105) holds. Given an ǫ > 0, we have that
where the inequality comes from triangle inequality and Theorem A.1. Since both terms in this upper bound converge to zero, their sum, must as well. Therefore, (106) must hold.
Similarly we can combine probabilistic limits as follows. (105) is satisfied. Therefore, using Theorem A.4
Since many of the limits in this paper deal with the average outer product of random vectors, it is important to know how and when these limits converge. The following theorem provides sufficient conditions for convergence.
Theorem A.6. Consider the sequences of vectors (f i )
. Let η and ǫ be scalar values such that 0 < η < ∞ and ǫ > 1. If
Proof. For (112) to hold, each of the element must also converge to 0 with probability 1. Therefore we will consider an arbitrary element and show it converges using an inequality derived from Chebyshev's inequality. Selecting the element in an arbitrary row m and column n such that 0 ≤ m ≤ s and 0 ≤ n ≤ t, let
then the sum for this single element can be written as
In order to use Chebyshev's inequality we must first bound the second moment of ρ i . We start by expanding ρ 2 i using (115) and canceling like terms to get
Expanding the expectation in the first term using [55, Equation 2.3.8] and once again canceling like terms results in
Distributing the norm across the addition and multiplication using triangle inequality and the sub-multiplicative property of the 2 norm we then get the upper bound
Proof. We prove this result using Theorem A.8. First note that using (13)- (19) , (22)- (23), and assuming α = 0 we can write
where
since the eigenvalues of upper block diagonal matrices are the set of eigenvalues of the block elements on the diagonal and Ā n < η A1 < 1 and A n < η A2 < 1. Furthermore, denote Since B n , L n , Σ e , Σ w,n , Σ z,n , Σ ζ,n , and Σ ω,n are all bounded we have that Σ b,n < ǫ 2 for some 0 ≤ ǫ 2 < ∞. Denoting
we are able to complete the proof using Theorem A.8.
Since the asymptotic attack power uses the inner product of v n while most other limits use outer products, we relate these limits in the following Lemma. 
Since the LHS of (148) converges to zero as i → ∞ as a result of our assumption, the RHS must do so as well which directly implies the LHS of (146) holds. Now assume that the LHS of (146) holds. Then since
and for the matrix to converge it must also converge elementwise, we have that the RHS of (146) also holds.
Next, we show that if conditions such as (C2) do not hold, linear transforms of the limit also do not converge to zero given the conditions in the following lemma hold.
Lemma A.11. Consider a family of matrices R n ∈ R t×s with full column rank. Assume there exists η ∈ R such that 0 < η ≤ λ n , where λ n is the smallest eigenvalue of R T n R n . Furthermore, consider a sequence of random vectors f n ∼ N (0 s×1 , Σ f ) such that Σ f,n is positive semi-definite. If
and p-lim 
Applying Lemma A.10 we have that p-lim
This implies that p-lim
n R n f n . Since the limit is not affected by the constant η, and using Lemma A.10, this contradicts (151). Therefore, (152) must hold.
B. Ommited Equations
The following equations were ommited from the proof of Theorem III.11 to improve readability. First, note that 
where the first equality comes from evaluating the expectation, the inequality comes from distributing the norm using triangle inequality and the subadditivity of the spectral norm, bounding the individual terms, and allowing the summation to include j = m ′ and go to infinity, and the final inequality comes from evaluating the summation. Using similar reasoning, we also have E n−1 j=0 n+i−1 k=0 
